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  1 
Article 
Human Rights Conditions: What We Know and 
Why it Matters1 
David Weissbrodt and Patrick Finnegan 
Abstract 
It may be impossible to understand the cause of every 
human rights violation. Causal research is a useful endeavor, 
however, as it sheds light on the conditions that produce human 
rights violations and compliance. Such knowledge can help 
improve the effectiveness of human rights advocacy strategies to 
target and influence these conditions. This survey examines four 
broad themes: (A) Government Behavior and Structure; (B) 
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POLICY, AND PROCESS (4th ed. 2009). 
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Armed Conflict; (C) Economic Factors; and (D) Psychological 
Factors. The findings by scholars and practitioners are myriad 
and complex, but some general trends are observable. 
Democratic governments tend to better protect a broad range of 
human rights, especially when paired with an independent 
judiciary. Democratization may involve short-term disruption 
but has long-term payoffs in respect for human rights. 
Repression in weak states heightens the likelihood of civil wars. 
Armed conflict, in turns, tends to generate the most grave 
human rights abuses. Economic factors are deeply intertwined 
with the full spectrum of human rights in two key ways: (1) the 
distribution of resources (economic, social, and cultural rights); 
and (2) economic structures and incentives that may encourage 
repression. Individual psychological factors, such as the 
tendency to obey authority, group identity, and exclusionary 
ideologies can lead people to commit atrocities, especially in the 
context of armed conflict. 
Following this overview, the article discusses some of the 
controversies and challenges in human rights research. These 
issues include: differences in qualitative and quantitative 
methods; surveillance bias in statistical work; and the difficulty 
of comparative work. The article then explores theories of how 
international human rights norms influence state behavior and 
how this influence affects domestic conditions. The article 
concludes by reiterating that causal research can improve 
advocacy, and adds that it may serve a persuasive function as 
well. Causal research can help human rights advocates make the 
case for policies that contribute to the promotion and protection 
of human rights. It can do so by establishing the credibility of 
policy proposals, demonstrating that advocates understand the 
problems they seek to address. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
International human rights have traditionally been the 
domain of lawyers and political activists, but now constitute a 
rapidly developing area spanning an array of disciplines and 
professions, including anthropology, economics, law, political 
science, public health, public policy, and sociology. Research on 
what causes human rights violations and compliance is a 
relatively recent development. It is a lively, expanding, and 
contested area of inquiry, due in no small part to the complexity 
of the subject matter. 
Human rights abuses do not emanate from a single cause or 
even a single set of causes. They can also be highly contextual; 
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factors that may relate to poor human rights compliance in some 
countries may seem to have no consequence in others. One may 
start by asking if there are really causes or merely innumerable 
contributing factors to human rights violations. If this is the 
case, is it worth it to do causal research at all? Can such an 
endeavor produce helpful generalizations? If so, would it have 
any practical use? 
Despite these difficulties, the authors of the present article 
believe the answer to these questions is “yes.” Studying the 
causes of human rights violations and compliance offers a wealth 
of useful information. Social scientist James Scott faced a 
similar dilemma in his study of the roots of resistance in settings 
of political and social domination. He observed that, even after 
all factors that might shed light on the matter had been 
considered, it remained impossible to predict with precision 
when or how collective acts of resistance will occur. He 
concluded, nonetheless, that there is “a role for social analysis in 
understanding this phenomenon.”2 A public health physician, for 
example, may not be able to predict whether a particular 
individual will fall ill, but he or she may be able to say something 
useful about the conditions that may facilitate an epidemic, and 
thereby develop solutions and preventive strategies. Strategies 
that successfully change these conditions can reduce the risk of 
infection for any given individual. 
Public health interventions include short-term crisis 
response and long-term preventive strategies. For example, in 
response to a cholera outbreak, a humanitarian agency may 
deploy medical teams to treat affected persons. In the long-term, 
increasing access to clean drinking water and adequate 
sanitation will eliminate some of the biggest risk factors for 
waterborne diseases. Similarly, if human rights researchers can 
identify key political, economic, and social conditions that lead 
to human rights violations, they can develop and recommend 
corrective solutions. For instance, short-term remedial measures 
can include immediate political and legal action, such as 
organizing peaceful protests or filing court cases in response to 
specific violations. In the long-term, political and economic 
pressure can be brought to bear on a state, both domestically and 
internationally, to alter repressive patterns of behavior and 
enact democratic reforms. 
 
 2. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN 
TRANSCRIPTS 218 (1990). 
2019] HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS 5 
While research on human rights conditions has advanced 
considerably in recent years, much work remains to be done to 
develop a fuller understanding. Scholars and practitioners have 
used empirical methods to test different theories. A few areas, 
such as government behavior and armed conflict, have been 
studied more than others. Similarly the causes of certain types 
of human rights abuses have received more attention than 
others; scholars have examined violations of personal integrity 
rights in far more detail than economic and social rights. This 
article presents an overview of the most common causal theories 
pertaining to human rights conditions, highlighting a number of 
important studies and insights. It also identifies challenges and 
gaps in the research. This article then discusses how 
international human rights norms influence state behavior. It 
concludes by arguing that causal research itself plays a role in 
advancing the human rights movement. Although the article 
draws on a variety of sources, it is not exhaustive owing to space 
constraints. Interested readers are encouraged to further 
explore the causal literature on human rights conditions to 
enrich their understanding. 
 
II. CAUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND 
COMPLIANCE 
Various sources produce information on human rights 
abuses, including governments, international governmental 
organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
activists, journalists/media outlets, and scholars engaged in field 
research, as well as firsthand accounts from victims, witnesses, 
and perpetrators. Such information is commonly generated 
through fact-finding inquiries undertaken by IGOs, NGOs, and 
governments. Depending on its mandate, a fact-finding inquiry 
may entail such activities as: long- or short-term investigations 
(involving interviews and site visits); research; needs 
assessments (e.g., for humanitarian, social, or other assistance); 
trial observations; prison visits; visits to refugee camps; and 
election observations. 
Two of the most widely-used sources of information for 
scholarly research on human rights violations are the U.S. State 
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and 
Amnesty International’s Annual Reports. Based on these 
reports, scholars developed two of the most commonly used 
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quantitative human rights indices, which are: (1) the Political 
Terror Scale (PTS) and (2) the Cingranelli-Richards Human 
Rights Dataset (CIRI).3 PTS and CIRI each have their own 
numerical scales to rate abuse levels, with each level 
representing a certain frequency or intensity of human rights 
violations. 
Since human rights cover many aspects of human existence, 
however, not all categories of rights can be assessed in the same 
way. PTS and CIRI mostly focus on abuses of personal integrity 
rights, such as extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, 
and arbitrary arrest.4 Two other commonly used indices—the 
Freedom in the World Reports and the Polity IV Project—are 
used to measure civil and political rights based on analysis of a 
country’s government structure and practices.5 There are no 
widely accepted standard measures for economic and social 
rights compliance, which partially explains the relative lack of 
research in this area. Although some scholars use economic 
development data to gauge such rights, such as the Human 
Development Index,6 these indicators do not necessarily offer 
information on government efforts to comply with economic and 
social rights obligations.7 In an effort to fill this gap, Fukuda-
 
 3. See David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards & K. Chad Clay, CIRI 
HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT (2014), http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/ 
data-documentation.html; Mark Gibney et al., THE POLITICAL TERROR SCALE 
(2015), http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Data-Archive.html. It should 
be noted that PTS has recently added Human Rights Watch reports as a third 
source for country rankings, but this dataset is much less complete than the 
U.S. State Department and Amnesty International reports. 
 4. CIRI also has some data on civil and political rights, as well as the 
rights of women and workers. See CIRI HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, 
Frequently Asked Questions (2011), http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/faq. 
html. 
 5. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2016 (2016), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf; Monty 
G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, The Polity Project, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2018). 
Measures of democratic governance are often used as a proxy for civil and 
political rights compliance. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & James Ron, Seeing 
Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, 61 
WORLD POL. 360, 365 (2009). A useful resource for comparing constitutional 
structures between countries is the Constitute Project. See Zachary Elkins et 
al., CONSTITUTE PROJECT, https://www.constituteproject.org (last visited Jan. 
21, 2019). 
 6. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Index (HDI), 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (last visited Jan. 
21, 2019). 
 7. Hafner-Burton & Ron, supra note 5, at 29, 387. 
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Parr et al. have created the Social and Economic Rights 
Fulfillment (SERF) index, which “uses international 
administrative and survey data” to establish a measure of how 
well a country fulfills its economic and social rights obligations 
relative to its available resources.8 Preliminary results from 
SERF data analysis are discussed infra on pages 23–25. 
The following four sections will cover, broadly speaking, the 
most studied causes of human rights violations identified by 
researchers and practitioners: (1) Government Behavior and 
Structure; (2) Armed Conflict; (3) Economic Factors; and (4) 
Psychological Factors. Although each section covers ostensibly 
different subject matter, these categories are necessarily 
artificial. Different causes of human rights abuses are often 
deeply interconnected. Furthermore, certain human rights 
abuses may themselves lead to additional violations. 
A. GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR AND STRUCTURE  
Government behavior and structure are two of the most 
obvious places to look for human rights violations. In the 
international human rights system, states are the primary 
bearers of responsibility for human rights conditions. As such, 
government is one of the most thoroughly studied areas in the 
research, especially as it pertains to personal integrity rights. To 
make this subject matter easier to digest, this section is broken 
down into five subtopics: (1) Early Studies; (2) The Decision to 
Repress; (3) Democracy and Democratization; (4) Judicial 
Independence and Transitional Justice; and (5) Corruption. 
1.  Early Studies 
The traditional argument has been that democratic 
governments respect rights more than authoritarian ones, 
therefore efforts to democratize will reduce human rights 
violations. Early studies on human rights violations supported 
this theory. In one of the first studies of its kind, Mitchell and 
McCormick tested several purported causes of human rights 
violations using quantitative indicators.9 They carried out their 
 
 8. SAKIKO FUKUDA-PARR ET AL., FULFILLING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS 15 (2015). 
 9. Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political 
Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476, 484–85 (1988). 
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study prior to the existence of PTS and CIRI, so Mitchell and 
McCormick devised their own measures of violations based on 
the Amnesty International World Report of 1985.10 They coded 
123 countries for (1) torture and arbitrary killing; and (2) 
political imprisonment.11 They tested several theories on 
government behavior. For example, Chomsky and Herman, 
among others, argued that the United States and other first 
world countries fueled human rights violations in the third 
world by supporting governments that repress to maintain 
favorable investment conditions; in other words, countries with 
more external capitalist interest will have higher levels of 
repression.12 Mitchell and McCormick did find that countries 
with medium or high levels of trade with Western countries 
experienced high levels of imprisonment and torture, but these 
correlations diminished when controlled for a country’s 
population size. 
In the late 1970s, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who later became U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, 
advanced a theory that communist “totalitarian” governments 
are necessarily worse human rights abusers than “traditional” 
authoritarian governments.13 Mitchell and McCormick found 
partial support for Kirkpatrick’s assertion in terms of political 
imprisonment, even when controlling for population and 
income.14 When examining torture, however, Mitchell and 
McCormick found that traditional authoritarian governments 
tortured more often than communist governments.15 In the 
aggregate, combining torture and imprisonment, Mitchell and 
McCormick observed no significant difference between the two 
regime types. 
Howard and Donnelly argued that classically liberal 
governments necessarily respect human rights more than 
communitarian governments,16 since communitarian regimes 
 
 10. Id. at 484. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See NOAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD S. HERMAN, THE WASHINGTON 
CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM (1979). 
 13. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, 68 COMMENT. 
34–44 (1979). 
 14. Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 9, at 493–94. 
 15. Id. at 494–95. 
 16. Howard and Donnelly define “communitarian societies” as “those 
[societies] that give ideological and practical priority to the community 
(sometimes embodied in the state) over the individual.” See Rhoda E. Howard 
& Jack Donnelly, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes, 80 
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subordinate individual rights to a larger collectivity.17 Mitchell 
and McCormick tested a “lighter” version of this theory—that 
liberal governments tend to respect human rights more than 
communitarian ones—and found the conclusion to be essentially 
correct.18 Their data could not, however, confirm the stronger 
formulation of the argument as expressed by Howard and 
Donnelly. Mitchell and McCormick’s study was certainly a 
landmark for its time, but it did have a key limitation: it did not 
employ historical data on human rights trends over time.19 This 
issue was addressed by subsequent scholarly work, including the 
creation of PTS (and later on, CIRI), which assigned human 
rights ratings on an annual basis.20 
In 1994, Poe and Tate published another seminal study that 
focused on personal integrity rights abuses, including murder, 
torture, disappearance, and political imprisonment.21 Their data 
included 153 countries for the years 1980–87. Their findings 
supported some of the same conclusions of Mitchell and 
McCormick’s study. They found that democratic governance and 
the presence of armed conflict were the two most significant 
aspects of repression.22 Levels of economic development and 
population size had effects as well, but less dramatic than 
democracy or warfare. Their analysis found no significant effects 
emanating from population growth rates, British cultural 
influence, or military control. In 1999, Poe, Tate, and Keith 
followed up this study by revisiting their earlier model with a 
larger PTS dataset, analyzing the human rights practices of over 
150 countries between 1976 and 1993.23 Their findings 
confirmed some of their earlier results, but contradicted others. 
For example, they found clearly that military control of a country 
was associated with higher levels of repression.24 Similarly, 
countries with a British colonial legacy experienced less 
 
AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 801, 808 (1986). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 9, at 496. 
 19. Id. at 484. 
 20. Cingranelli et al., supra note 3; Gibney et al., supra note 3. 
 21. See Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to 
Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 
854 (1994). 
 22. Id. at 866. 
 23. Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal 
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–
1993, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 291, 292 (1999). 
 24. Id. at 305. 
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personal integrity abuse (relative to other countries).25 
Additionally, this second study’s results suggested that economic 
growth has a negative impact on repression, but that a one 
percent annual population increase has a positive relationship 
to human rights abuses.26 
Although Poe and Tate (and later Keith) studied similar 
types of human rights violations to those abuses explored by 
Mitchell and McCormick, they disagreed on a key point. As noted 
supra, Mitchell and McCormick measured two categories of 
violations: (1) political imprisonment; and (2) torture and 
arbitrary killing. They justify making this distinction on the 
grounds that torture and killing constitute a separate and 
“qualitatively worse activity” than political imprisonment.27 
Secondly, Mitchell and McCormick argue that, empirically 
speaking, “there is a considerable gulf between states with 
political prisoners and those [states] that use torture and 
killing.”28 Poe and Tate rejected that dichotomy in their 1994 
study. They argued that torture, execution, disappearance, and 
political imprisonment all manifest in a single dimension: the 
willingness of a regime to harm citizens it sees as a threat.29 
2. The Decision to Repress 
While more recent research confirms the essential finding 
that authoritarian governments violate human rights more than 
democratic ones, there is some nuance. In her review of social 
sciences research on human rights, Hafner-Burton notes that 
the process of democratization can lead to political instability, 
which can result in human rights abuses.30 Conversely, not all 
authoritarian governments are equally repressive; personalist 
or military dictatorships tend more toward severe violence than 
single-party governments.31 Even with this caveat, Sikkink 
notes that there is a lack of convincing evidence that 
governments transitioning to democracy perpetrate more abuses 
than authoritarian governments. Furthermore, these “semi-
 
 25. Id. at 291. 
 26. Id. at 307. 
 27. Mitchell & McCormick, supra note 9, at 484. 
 28. Id. at 484–85. 
 29. Poe et al., supra note 21, at 298. 
 30. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A Social Science of Human Rights, 51 J. 
PEACE RES. 273, 275 (2014). 
 31. Id. at 275–76. 
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democracies” are far less prone to genocidal violence.32 
One of the most basic findings pertaining to why states 
choose to repress is that they respond to threats—real or 
perceived—to the established political order. Reviewing four 
decades of literature on repressive behavior by national 
governments, Davenport notes, 
Considering different time periods and countries, as well 
as a wide variety of measurements for both conflict and 
repression, every statistical investigation of the subject 
has found a positive influence. When challenges to the 
status quo take place, authorities generally employ some 
form of repressive action to counter or eliminate the 
behavioral threat; in short, there appears to be a ‘Law of 
Coercive Responsiveness.’33 
While this notion may seem intuitive, the evidence shows 
important details. Researchers have constructed more complex 
models of government decision-making, where leaders engage in 
cost-benefit analyses of repressive tactics, selecting repression 
when they believe benefits exceed costs and success is likely.34 
As Sikkink writes, “According to the rational choice approach, 
those in power choose to repress dissent when the costs of doing 
so are lower than the costs of institutionalizing liberal 
democracy.”35 In this framework, states are rational actors 
concerned with the preservation and/or expansion of their 
authority. The effects of repression on dissent, however, vary 
greatly; sometimes repression succeeds in quelling opposition, 
but other times it does not.36 
3. Democracy and Democratization 
The process of democratization can play a key role in a 
government’s threat calculations. As Hafner-Burton notes, 
“[d]emocratization can threaten incumbent leaders, who then 
resort to abuses in order to hold on to power. Threatened leaders 
 
 32. KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 193–94 (2017). 
 33. Christian Davenport, State Repression and Political Order, 10 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 1, 7 (2007). 
 34. Id. at 4. 
 35. SIKKINK, supra note 32, at 185. 
 36. Davenport, supra note 33, at 8. 
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can also encourage nationalism, which in turn can lead to 
conflicts and abuse.”37 So, while a country may be transitioning 
from authoritarian to democratic structures, proto-democratic 
leaders often still view threats to their incumbency with an 
authoritarian mentality. Scholars have given this transitional 
repression the somewhat macabre designation of “more murder 
in the middle.”38 Presidential elections in these circumstances 
can result in leaders using political terror to assure their victory. 
Some research suggests, however, that national legislative 
elections are often accompanied by improved respect for human 
rights, even in some authoritarian settings.39 
Researchers have observed that countries must deeply 
internalize democratic norms to see major reductions in personal 
integrity violations.40 Once achieved, this “democratic threshold” 
then leads to significant decreases in government repression.41 
For instance, the analysis of Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
corroborated previous scholarship suggesting that, as 
democratization progresses, established leaders feel threatened 
and use repression to hold on to power.42 Their study highlighted 
multiparty electoral competition and constraints on executive 
power as the most significant factors in achieving the democratic 
threshold; elections without these crucial features may signify 
poor human rights conditions.43 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. also suggest that democratization 
must be a long-term enterprise in order to succeed. Early 
democratic reforms yield little discernible immediate benefit, 
but are necessary steps to reaching the democratic threshold: 
“[T]he creation of a government that effectively protects human 
rights can be a slow and frustrating process. It can be slow 
because it requires a substantial number of institutional reforms 
to be in place. And it can be frustrating because most of the 
reforms that are necessary will not immediately lead to better 
human rights protection. The payoff will only come after a 
number of reforms are made.”44 
 
 37. Hafner-Burton, supra note 30, at 275. 
 38. Davenport, supra note 33, at 11. 
 39. Hafner-Burton, supra note 30, at 275–76. 
 40. Id. at 275. 
 41. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 33, at 11. 
 42. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look 
at Democracy and Human Rights, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 439, 451 (2005). 
 43. Id. at 449–50. 
 44. Id. at 455. 
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Chronic personal integrity rights abuses, however, still 
occur in some well-established democracies.45 Improved 
accountability measures for human rights in democratic 
societies may lead the authorities to use methods of torture or 
ill-treatment that leave less visible marks. In his detailed study 
of torture and democracy, Rejali argues that “[p]ublic monitoring 
leads institutions that favor painful coercion to . . . evade 
detection, and, to the extent that public monitoring is not only 
greater in democracies, but that public monitoring of human 
rights is a core value in modern democracies, it is the case that 
where we find democracies torturing today we will also be more 
likely to find stealthy torture.”46 Rejali observes that monitoring 
has even had an effect on non-democratic states. He cites several 
historical examples of authoritarian governments choosing less 
visible torture techniques when the target prisoners were 
subject to more international scrutiny, especially with the 
development of international human rights monitoring.47 
While Rejali readily concedes that the torture record of 
democratic states is, as a whole, less severe than authoritarian 
states, he explores why some democracies have legalized torture 
or violated prohibitions on its practice. Once again, threat or the 
perception of threat are key factors. During a time of crisis, for 
example, well-established national security bureaucracies and 
agencies can overwhelm democratic restraint, circumventing or 
co-opting normal accountability mechanisms.48 On a more 
individual level, Rejali theorizes that justice systems that value 
and privilege confessions by persons accused of crimes may 
incentivize law enforcement to resort to coercive techniques 
against suspects.49 Despite these findings, however, democratic 
governance still appears to be a decisive factor in the 
improvement of human right conditions. As Sikkink observes, 
“[N]umerous studies on the causes of human rights violations 
have made it clear that democracy is essential for human rights 
to succeed, but not sufficient. While many democracies do not 
have robust human rights practices, there are not any countries 
 
 45. Hafner-Burton & Ron, supra note 5, at 372. Hafner-Burton and Ron 
estimate that just over 36% of the global population live in democracies where 
major human rights abuses occur, although they acknowledge that India’s 
enormous population size accounts for most of this number. 
 46. DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 8 (2007). 
 47. Id. at 12–13. 
 48. Id. at 46–49 (discussing French police and army actions in Algeria 
during the 1950s). 
 49. Id. at 49–55. 
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with robust human rights practices that are not democracies.”50 
4. Judicial Independence and Transitional Justice 
Various studies have attempted to disaggregate which 
specific factors of government behavior and structure are most 
significant to reducing personal integrity rights violations. 
While the research has yielded useful insights into individual 
characteristics of democracy, it also suggests that these 
characteristics are most effective when packaged together as a 
comprehensive set of reforms. For example, in 2009, Keith, Poe, 
and Tate tested the effects of three key types of constitutional 
provisions on state repression: (1) Individual freedoms 
protections (free speech, assembly, etc.); (2) Independence of the 
judiciary; and (3) Restrictions on the use of emergency 
measures.51 Of the judicial independence variables examined, 
those factors relating to the insulation of regular courts from 
political interference proved most significant in reducing human 
rights abuses.52 The strongest findings in Keith, Poe, and Tate’s 
study, however, pertained to constitutional restrictions on the 
use of emergency measures by government officials.53 Especially 
important were (1) the requirement of legislative approval 
before a state of emergency can be declared; and (2) the 
prohibition on the dissolution of the legislature during a state of 
emergency.54 
Keith, Poe, and Tate found many constitutional provisions 
on individual freedoms to be statistically insignificant by 
themselves.55 They proved significant, however, when 
aggregated. This finding suggests that constitutional rights 
protections must operate in tandem to be effective, rather than 
be adopted as single provisions in isolation. When Keith, Poe, 
and Tate ran their statistical models over a ten-year period, the 
results suggested a significant aggregate positive impact on 
respect for personal integrity rights.56 
Constitutional provisions for an independent judicial 
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branch of government have increasingly become a global norm 
of state structure since the end of the Cold War. In addition to 
Keith, Poe, and Tate, many theorists have identified an 
independent judiciary as a critical component of democracy that 
promotes respect for human rights. When the judiciary is 
sufficiently empowered, the argument goes, it has a constraining 
effect on state behavior by imposing material and reputational 
costs for the use of repression.57 Other commentators caution, 
however, that even institutionally independent courts may not 
always issue rulings that are favorable to human rights. If a 
given political environment is authoritarian in nature, even 
independent courts may produce jurisprudence more consistent 
with that prevailing ethos.58 
In her detailed study of political repression and courts, 
Keith tested the effects of de facto judicial independence on 
personal integrity rights and civil liberties. Her findings suggest 
that, in general, an independent judiciary does in fact reduce the 
probability of state repression.59 Crabtree and Fariss reached 
the same general conclusion in a study using different statistical 
models and some variable substitutions.60 Keith’s study also 
sheds light on the relationship between formal judicial 
independence, as set forth in constitutions, and actual state 
practice. She found that the largest predictor of current judicial 
independence is past judicial independence, suggesting that a 
state’s political culture is a critical factor that self-reinforces 
over time.61 Her analysis also found that the presence of formal, 
constitutional provisions establishing judicial autonomy 
generally have a positive effect on actual practice, but only when 
accompanied by multiparty electoral competition and 
constraints on executive power.62 In this context, the courts may 
function as an alternate venue through which governing factions 
that lose power may continue to influence policy or protect 
themselves from repression by successor governments.63 
Connected to the accountability rendered by independent 
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courts, evidence suggests that prosecuting perpetrators of past 
human rights violations in countries transitioning to democracy 
improves human rights practices. Kim and Sikkink have 
demonstrated that transitional countries that undertook human 
rights prosecutions experienced less repression over time than 
those countries that did not.64 In a subsequent study, Kim and 
Sikkink probed this finding in further detail, using data on 
human rights conditions in seventy-eight transitional countries 
between 1980 and 2009.65 They explored the effects of human 
rights trials, both in terms of process and verdicts. In general, 
prosecutions that result in convictions have the greatest 
mitigating effect on repression.66 
Kim and Sikkink also found that the process of prosecution 
(arrests, indictments, trials, etc.) served to reduce repression, 
albeit to a lesser degree than conviction. Additionally, the effect 
of human rights trials on repression is much higher for high-
level prosecutions (i.e., of high-ranking officials suspected of 
grave abuses) than low-level prosecutions. High-level 
convictions had an additional specific deterrence effect on 
extrajudicial killings.67 While prosecutions that led to acquittals 
did not decrease repression in the aggregate, they still appeared 
to deter torture. It is not fully clear as to why, but Kim and 
Sikkink venture that “it is possible that prosecution adds an 
additional and necessary level of enforcement that challenges 
the torturers’ sense of secrecy and immunity . . . .”68 
5.  Corruption 
Another significant factor in whether a government respects 
human rights norms is corruption. It is a clear display of the 
interdependence of civil and political rights, on the one hand, 
and economic, social, and cultural rights, on the other. Official 
corruption can have a significant effect on a government’s 
respect for its economic, social, and cultural rights obligations. 
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In its simplest form, the theft of public resources for the private 
gain of corrupt officials detracts from a government’s capacity to 
invest in providing access to food, water, educational 
opportunity, or adequate health infrastructure. 
Corruption usually infringes on the right to equal protection 
before the law, which is a bedrock principle of international 
human rights. Corrupt practices exclude certain individuals and 
groups from protections and access to public goods, while 
providing preferential treatment for others, violating the 
tenants of non-discrimination.69 As Sepúlveda Carmona and 
Bacio-Terracino note, “Article 26 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits discrimination in 
law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public 
authorities, and its application is not limited to those rights 
provided for in the ICCPR.”70 Corruption has a particularly 
detrimental effect on vulnerable groups, such as the poor, who 
lack the financial means, or political influence, to obtain 
favorable treatment.71 
Corrupt acts can be direct human rights violations. 
Sepúlveda Carmona and Bacio-Terracino provide several 
examples. For instance, if a judge is bribed to influence the 
outcome of a case, it is a violation of fair trial rights. If someone 
must bribe a doctor for treatment at a public hospital, his or her 
right to adequate health is denied. Direct violations may also 
result from a failure of government officials to exercise due 
diligence to prevent other officials from perpetrating corrupt 
acts.72 Corruption may also lead indirectly to abuses, serving as 
a necessary condition of human rights violations. For example, 
border officials could be bribed by human traffickers to enable 
cross-border movement of trafficked persons for sexual 
exploitation. Although the officials may not be directly engaged 
in the immediate act of trafficking, they are accessories, without 
the participation of whom the violation could not occur. 
Corruption may contribute to a broader socio-political context in 
which human rights are easily disregarded. Take, for example, 
a corrupt electoral process that leads to protests against election 
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results that are then violently put down by the government. The 
government in question may resort to arbitrary detention, 
torture, and/or extrajudicial killings to suppress dissent.73 
B.   ARMED CONFLICT 
Armed conflict is one of the best understood causes of 
human rights violations. Whether international armed conflict 
or—as is more often the case in the 21st century—non-
international armed conflict, wartime conditions enable the 
most serious of human rights abuses to occur. The evidence 
suggests a cyclical relationship: inasmuch as armed conflict 
causes human rights violations, widespread human rights 
abuses may also lead to armed conflict. As Hafner-Burton writes, 
“Scholars now know with high certainty that one of the most 
significant predictors of political terror is violent conflict. The 
central insight about violent conflict is that it creates cycles of 
human rights abuse that are difficult to interrupt.”74 
1.   State Capacity and Civil War 
During armed conflict, weak states may employ extreme 
violence to assert or reassert dominance. They may also be 
unable to exert disciplined command and control over their own 
armed forces and proxies to stop them from abusing the 
population. In some cases, states may lack the critical capacity 
to stop insurgent or terrorist groups from committing human 
rights violations. Englehart argues that state weakness is now 
the more widespread problem, globally speaking, than the 
excesses of powerful states.75 Many states have difficulty 
exercising basic authority owing to a combination of factors, such 
as colonial legacies of corruption or ethnic conflict, as well as 
uneven development and inadequate infrastructure.76 Although 
states bear primary legal responsibility for human rights 
conditions within their territory, weak or failed states lack the 
capacity to restrain third party violators or even their own 
agents. This lack of control can have dire consequences during 
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armed conflict as state security forces can abuse the population 
with impunity and civilians may use the chaos of war to settle 
grudges.77 In his empirical analysis, Englehart found that 
increased state capacity correlates with more respect for 
personal integrity rights, including a significant reduction in 
extrajudicial killings.78 
If state weakness itself can cause human rights violations, 
it may also lead to armed conflict, which can generate further 
abuses. As Rost observes: 
[G]overnment-sponsored violations of the most basic 
human rights to personal integrity are closely linked 
with a high risk of civil war onset. Furthermore, state 
weakness contributes to increasing the risk of civil war, 
which is in line with most studies on civil war onset. As 
the simulations [in this study] show, it is the combination 
of state weakness and repression that pushes civil war 
risk to its highest levels.79 
Low-level conflict in weak states can trigger a cycle of 
human rights abuses that escalates into civil war. Perceiving a 
threat to its power, a government may crack down on an 
opposition group and on other civilians it believes to be affiliated. 
This repression may provoke armed resistance against the 
government. To compensate for their lack of power relative to 
the state, rebel groups may resort to guerrilla tactics, possibly 
relying on civilian support. Government forces may, in turn, 
terrorize civilians in a bid to erode the rebels’ strength.80 Rost 
concludes that increasing government repression in weak states 
can thus be a useful predictor of impending civil war.81 
State weakness, political terror, and a cycle of violence often 
produce gendered harms in situations of civil war. Rape, for 
example, disproportionately affects women and girls in war 
zones. While men and boys are more likely to be killed in war as 
combatants (or potential combatants), women and girls tend to 
suffer more acutely from less lethal violence like rape, as well as 
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displacement and lack of medical care.82 As Cohen argues, the 
private crime of rape is common in many societies, but wartime 
rape often has distinct characteristics, including public 
commission of the act, often by multiple perpetrators, which can 
have a terror effect on the population.83 
2.   External Effects and Influences 
Civil war can also influence human rights conditions outside 
of the immediately affected state. Danneman and Ritter argue 
that states near other states experiencing civil war will increase 
domestic repression to preempt the spread of rebellion.84 Civil 
wars seldom remain contained within national borders and often 
have spillover effects on neighboring nations.85 The authors’ 
analysis leads them to conclude that: 
Generally, leaders are wary of civil strife in their 
neighborhood spreading to their nation. To prevent 
diffusion, they increase repression . . . These findings 
suggest leaders are concerned primarily with the 
mechanical drivers of civil war diffusion that are tied to 
geography, such as refugee flows and transnational rebel 
groups, rather than cultural or political similarities . . .86 
 
In this context, states undertake repression not to imitate 
their neighbors, but to “avoid their fate.”87 Danneman and Ritter 
interpret the events of the “Arab Spring” of 2011 through their 
model. When major dissent broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, 
other Middle Eastern and North African governments engaged 
in preemptive crackdowns, notably Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, 
Libya, and Syria. The results of these repressive policies had 
different effects: Whereas in Algeria and Iran, government 
authority prevailed (at least in the short-term), brutal civil wars 
 
 82. Dara Kay Cohen, Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National 
Evidence (1980–2009), 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461, 462 (2013). 
 83. Id. at 464. 
 84. See Nathan Danneman & Emily Hencken Ritter, Contagious Rebellion 
and Preemptive Repression, 58 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 254, 255 (2014). 
 85. Id. at 255–56.. 
 86. Id. at 272. 
 87. Id. at 254, 273. 
2019] HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS 21 
erupted in Libya and Syria.88 
A number of studies have found that international arms 
transfers tend to exacerbate human rights violations in 
repressive or conflict-afflicted states, and sometimes in states 
that carry both these characteristics.89 When the Cold War came 
to an end, the arms market dynamic in the West, Eastern 
Europe, and the former Soviet Union changed in notable ways; 
many countries cut their defense budgets, decreasing domestic 
demand and placing pressure on arms manufacturers to find 
new markets through exports. The U.S. offered favorable loan 
terms for arms purchases, encouraging its embassies around the 
world to facilitate sales. In many former Eastern Bloc and Soviet 
countries, surplus arms and military-focused infrastructure 
encouraged aggressive marketing for arms exports.90 The post-
Cold War weapons market fueled the often ethnically charged 
armed conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s: “For example, it was not 
only major suppliers such as the French, the Belgians, and the 
Russians that sold arms and ammunition to Rwanda before the 
genocide in 1994, but also a number of former communist 
countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia.”91   
C. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic context is a vital piece of the human rights puzzle 
and is deeply intertwined with political and social context. 
Economic factors influence human rights conditions in two broad 
ways: firstly, in the distribution of resources, which has the most 
direct implications for economic and social rights. Major 
inequalities or the misappropriation of public goods for private 
gain can endanger human rights pertaining to basic needs, such 
as food, water, shelter, and adequate health. States may fail to 
make adequate efforts to provide for their population’s basic 
needs or may even deliberately deprive certain groups of 
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opportunities and resources. States may also fail to prevent 
violations of economic, social, and cultural rights by third 
parties, such as businesses. Secondly, economic structures and 
incentives can encourage governments to repress their 
populations, resulting in civil and political rights violations. For 
example, a government seeking to attract international 
investment by minimizing the cost of doing business may use 
force to break up a strike over low wages. 
As noted in the introduction of this piece, the literature on 
the relationship between economic factors and repression is 
more extensive than the study of economic, social, and cultural 
rights. Although there have been some notable advances in 
recent years, economic, social, and cultural rights remain, on the 
whole, a less studied and emphasized topic. This deficiency 
constitutes a key gap in the study of causes of human rights 
violations. 
1. The Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Gap 
Identifying violations of the rights contained in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) can be a difficult undertaking. Such assessment 
involves evaluating state efforts to promote those rights, not 
simply whether a state’s economic performance is adequate. 
Economic, social, and cultural rights are the subject of 
progressive realization over time, often requiring sustained 
engagement to meet everyone’s basic needs and improve living 
standards. Personal integrity abuses, however, can be curbed 
more quickly, by governments refraining from certain practices, 
such as arbitrary killing and torture.92 
Lack of agreement on the scope and application of economic, 
social, and cultural rights may also contribute to the difficulty of 
identifying violations, let alone causes. Amnesty International 
has noted that “[r]emaining scepticism about economic, social 
and cultural rights as enforceable rights is based on the 
perception that their scope and content are unclear, and that it 
is not appropriate for courts to interfere in these issues, as they 
involve political decisions on allocation of resources.”93 Western 
countries have traditionally placed less emphasis on these 
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rights, instead backing the primacy of civil and political rights.94 
This reluctance has affected UN human rights mechanisms, 
conferring less apparent value on economic, social, and cultural 
rights, despite the 1993 Vienna Declaration’s insistence on the 
equality and indivisibility of all rights categories.95 Although 
human rights NGOs and the UN have developed models for 
incorporating a human rights framework into government 
budgeting,96 these models are relatively new and it is not yet 
clear what effects they will have. 
Related to this research gap is the lack of international 
jurisprudence on economic, social, and cultural rights relative to 
civil and political rights. The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has generated a substantial body of General 
Comments and country review materials.97 It did not start 
operating, however, until 1987, eleven years after the ICESCR 
entered into force.98 Furthermore, the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR, establishing an individual complaint mechanism, only 
entered into force in 2013.99 By contrast, the Human Rights 
Committee began taking individual complaints and issuing 
jurisprudence in 1976, the year the Civil and Political Covenant 
and its first Optional Protocol entered into force.100 As Forman 
observes, “[C]ivil and political rights have had a several decades 
head-start in terms of jurisprudential development, leading to 
significant disparities in the depth of understanding between 
the two sets of rights.”101 
Another complication in the promotion of economic, social, 
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and cultural rights is the uneasy relationship between the 
human rights and development sectors. Efforts to incorporate 
human rights principles into international development 
programming have encountered a number of challenges.102 
Although “rights-based development” has become a popular 
framework, many development projects still result in significant 
human rights violations. In the case of the World Bank, major 
abuses occurred despite the existence of institutional safeguards 
designed to limit the negative consequences of Bank-sponsored 
projects.103 Vandenhole and Gready note that development 
agencies and human rights organizations are traditionally seen 
to have different relationships with the state.104 Development 
agencies generally view themselves as cooperative partners with 
the state, while human rights organizations challenge the state 
for its misconduct.105 The organizational culture of development 
agencies also poses a challenge. Technically-minded personnel 
focused on quantifiable outcomes may resist adopting a 
normative framework, such as human rights. Development 
organizations may also lack clear internal accountability 
standards for human rights.106 
Despite these persistent challenges, scholars and advocates 
are beginning to explore economic, social, and cultural rights in 
more depth. For example, as noted supra on pages 6–7, Fukuda-
Parr et al. developed the SERF index in an attempt to measure 
states’ fulfillment of economic and social rights obligations. 
Comparing SERF data to other human rights indicators, 
Fukuda-Parr et al. identified some key correlations. First, their 
findings confirmed previous research noting a positive 
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association between democracy and good governance, on the one 
hand, and better economic and social rights performance, on the 
other. While some authoritarian governments may succeed in 
fulfilling their economic and social rights responsibilities, they 
are—on the whole—more likely to fail in doing so.107 
Additionally, countries with constitutional or other domestic 
legal protections for socioeconomic rights performed better on 
the SERF index than countries without such measures.108 
Gender equality exhibited the strongest correlation with positive 
SERF scores. This observation led Fukuda-Parr et al. to note 
that “improved gender equality must necessarily be associated 
with the fulfillment of social and economic rights: a society that 
excludes half of its population cannot possibly be said to be 
fulfilling the rights of all of its members.”109 Although these 
scholars found no significant correlation between socioeconomic 
rights and human rights treaty ratification, they acknowledged 
that their “analysis is constrained by lack of sufficiently nuanced 
data.”110 These preliminary findings from the SERF index data 
are correlative, but not causal. They do, however, lay important 
groundwork for further research. 
2. Economic Factors and Repression 
Research has yielded insight into the connections between 
economic issues and repressive state behavior. In the early study 
by Mitchell and McCormick, discussed supra on pages 7–10, the 
authors tested what they called “the simple poverty thesis”111—
that is, that poorer countries experience more violations. They 
found partial support for this theory, noting that there appeared 
to be an income threshold at which countries experience a 
dramatic decrease in torture and/or political imprisonment.112 
Schmitz and Sikkink summarize two essential points from the 
“simple poverty” literature: First, resource scarcity constricts a 
government’s policy options, making repression a more 
appealing choice to maintain power. Secondly, resource-
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strapped governments use less-efficient methods of repression, 
requiring more frequent and intense application to maintain 
control.113 Some scholars believe the “simple poverty” approach 
is incomplete, as it does not examine other factors, such as a 
country’s distribution of wealth (an issue explored infra on pages 
28–31).114 
The basis of a country’s economy can influence its 
government’s conduct. For instance, evidence suggests that 
states often repress their residents when their economies are 
based on extractive industries.115 DeMeritt and Young studied 
the relationship between oil and/or natural gas wealth and 
personal integrity rights. They undertook to test the 
longstanding theory that countries that rely on fossil fuel for 
income and less on their populations as a tax base would 
experience more personal integrity rights violations. The 
phenomenon occurs, the argument goes, because taxation 
requires some form of popular consent, even if minimal; but oil, 
natural gas, and other similar resources do not come with this 
constraint.116 Income from oil and gas may also discourage 
leaders from developing a public goods infrastructure that would 
facilitate the generation and collection of tax revenue, thereby 
impeding economic development.117 
DeMeritt and Young’s statistical models yielded a positive 
relationship between a state’s reliance on oil or natural gas 
revenue and its use of repression, even when controlled for a 
variety of other potential factors, including higher levels of 
democracy. DeMeritt and Young further note that “Since oil 
increases repression and recent work has found that repression 
increases the likelihood of civil war . . . oil should also have an 
indirect impact on civil war onset.”118 The authors offer the 
caveat that their theory is one of general trends and probability: 
“Not all states that repress have oil . . . . Likewise, not all states 
with oil will repress [their populations].”119 
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A country’s external economic relationships may also affect 
its tendency to use coercive measures against its population. 
There is substantial debate among scholars on whether free 
trade and foreign direct investment improve or worsen human 
rights conditions.120 Many preferential trade agreements include 
human rights provisions, but the effectiveness of these terms is 
another source of debate; different studies have come to 
contradictory conclusions.121 Structural adjustment policies 
advanced by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank have been a source of controversy since their introduction 
in the 1980s. Structural adjustment required loan recipient 
nations to adopt a series of measures designed to shrink and 
decentralize governments, ostensibly to facilitate debt service 
and economic growth, as well as reduce corruption. These 
measures included cutting government social spending, 
privatizing state-owned enterprises, and reducing trade 
barriers. 
In their detailed study of the relationship between human 
rights and structural adjustment, Abouharb and Cingranelli 
analyzed variables pertaining to 131 countries for the time 
period of 1981 to 2003.122 They found that, on the whole, “World 
Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs usually cause 
increased hardship for the poor, greater civil conflict, and more 
repression of human rights, resulting in a lower rate of economic 
development.”123 Cuts in social spending and/or the 
establishment of user fees for social services mandated by the 
adjustment programs rendered access to critical goods and 
services, such as healthcare and potable water, unaffordable for 
the most needy.124 The unpopularity of these austerity measures 
has often led to protests in the past, which in turn resulted in an 
increased likelihood of government repression. Indeed, 
Abouharb and Cingranelli observed that “the longer the period 
that countries have spent under structural adjustment 
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agreements the worse are levels of government respect for 
personal integrity rights.”125 
These two scholars also observed, however, that structural 
adjustment was associated with notable improvements in 
democratic governance and some related civil and political 
rights: “Governments involved with structural adjustment the 
longest have better-developed democratic institutions. They 
have elections that are freer and fairer. Their citizens have more 
freedom to form and join organizations, and they have more 
freedom of speech and press.”126 
3.  Economic Inequality and Human Rights 
The impact of economic inequality on human rights 
conditions is an emerging area of focus. Amnesty International 
recently noted that “Gross economic and social inequality is an 
enduring reality in countries of all political colours, and all levels 
of development. In the midst of plenty, many are still unable to 
access even minimum levels of food, water, sanitation, 
education, health care and housing.”127 While there are 
currently no explicit human rights standards against major 
economic disparities, some scholars and practitioners argue that 
there is an “implicit obligation” to address income inequality.128 
As Aguilar and Saiz write, “Economic inequality is clearly a 
human rights concern where it can be shown to be a cause or 
consequence of human rights violations.”129 Two principal 
reasons why major income disparities are a human rights issue 
are: (1) the obligation of States Parties to the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other instruments to 
promote socioeconomic rights “to the maximum of [their] 
available resources;”130 and (2) the principle of equality and the 
prohibition on discrimination based on social status.131 
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In regard to available resources, corruption and the 
misappropriation of government resources play a key role, as 
discussed supra on pages 16–18. International tax law and 
policy are another potential source of socioeconomic rights 
violations. The simple formulation of this argument is that tax 
evasion, including the use of tax havens, diminishes resources 
that would otherwise be available to governments to fulfill such 
rights obligations as adequate healthcare and education. In its 
study of 500 tax treaties signed by African and Asian countries, 
ActionAid concluded that low-income countries lose billions of 
dollars annually owing to provisions on dividends and interest 
payments. Specifically, “[t]reaties that lower-income countries 
have with OECD countries . . . take away more rights to tax than 
those with non-OECD countries. Worryingly, the deals struck 
with OECD countries are getting worse over time.”132 As an 
example, ActionAid cites a provision in tax treaties signed by 
Bangladesh which causes the country to lose $85 million 
annually.133 This lost revenue could have paid for health services 
for 3.4 million people.134 The International Bar Association has 
concluded that countries that facilitate tax evasion, either 
domestically or abroad, could be in violation of their 
international human rights obligations.135 
Evidence shows that major economic inequality is 
associated with negative human rights conditions, especially 
with regard to discriminatory social outcomes.136 Human rights 
scholars have turned to economic, sociological, and public health 
studies for insight, matching the studies’ conclusions with 
international human rights obligations. Reviewing studies on 
the effects of income inequality, Balakrishnan et al. found that 
lower-income persons—and lower-income countries—
experienced worse health conditions and educational outcomes 
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relative to their higher income counterparts.137 MacNaughton’s 
review of pertinent literature reached similar conclusions, 
finding that, not only are health outcomes worse, but also that 
violence and discrimination are more prevalent in highly-
unequal societies.138 Analyzing data on inequality for UNICEF, 
Ortiz and Cummins found that “unequal societies, in general, 
are much more prone to political instability, or, in other words, 
to be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or forceful 
means, which includes politically-motivated violence and 
terrorism . . . .”139 Reaching a similar conclusion, the UN 
Independent Expert on foreign debt and human rights noted 
that “[I]f inequality entrenches social cleavages along regional, 
religious, racial or ethnic lines, social instability and violent 
internal conflict are more frequent.”140 
Some theoretical arguments focus on the incentives of the 
economic elite in highly-unequal societies. That is, a small elite 
with disproportionate wealth is more likely to engage in human 
rights abuses to protect their status. The incentive to repress 
may be intensified if the elite face strong redistributive demands 
from the general population.141 Landman and Larizza tested a 
hypothesis based on this theory: countries with greater 
concentrations of income and/or landed wealth are more likely 
to abuse civil and political rights. They concluded that “[b]road 
patterns of concentration of resources (particularly income), 
which some would see as violating the notion of the ‘progressive 
realization’ of economic and social rights, are related to patterns 
of abuse of personal integrity rights.”142 Although Landman and 
Larizza found that higher levels of democracy and economic 
development mitigate abuses to some degree, they concluded 
that “[O]ur results demonstrate that politically inclusive 
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institutions (in the form of democratic regimes) might not be 
sufficient to prevent rights abuses. Governments also need to 
pursue the realization of economically inclusive 
institutions . . . .”143 
D. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
The complex institutions and relationships that comprise 
governments and the global economy can make it easy to forget 
that each violation of human rights is a very personal event for 
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. By shifting one’s focus to 
the individual human beings involved in a given human rights 
abuse, new kinds of questions emerge. What factors motivate 
people to obey authority? What factors convince people to harm 
others for political or social ends? How do governments or other 
organizations use these factors to mobilize enough people to 
carry out large-scale repression? Conversely, what motivates 
people to overcome prejudice or resist violent behavior? Why do 
people often support pluralistic worldviews, including universal 
human rights? 
1. Authority 
Sociologist Max Weber once wrote that individuals conduct 
their social affairs and relationships according to their 
perception of “legitimate authority.”144 Individuals may accept 
this authority for a variety of reasons. They may identify 
personally with authority figures; they may feel a sense of duty 
to a greater whole; they may share ideological or religious beliefs 
with leaders; or they may obey an authority out of simple self-
interest.145 In the generation following World War II and the 
Holocaust, scholars of social psychology carried out studies to 
test the conditions in which ostensibly ordinary, “good” people 
might commit acts that violate their moral aversion to harming 
others. The most well known of these studies are Milgram’s 
studies of obedience and Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison 
Experiment. 
In 1961, social psychologist Stanley Milgram started a 
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series of experiments at Yale University designed to test 
“destructive obedience.”146 These initial experiments involved 
male subjects from a variety of occupations.147 The subjects were 
told that the purpose was to study the effects of physical 
punishment on memory. Each test involved an experimenter, 
one subject, and an accomplice (whom the subject believed to be 
another subject). In a rigged drawing, the subject was assigned 
to play the role of “teacher” and the accomplice was given the 
role of “learner.” The learner was connected to a shock generator 
and the subject was instructed to conduct memory tests with the 
learner. If the learner answered a question incorrectly, the 
subject administered an electrical shock. For each error, the 
experimenter directed the subject to increase the shock intensity 
by one step, even when the voltage reached dangerous levels. 
The subjects were only informed of the true nature of the 
experiment afterwards.148 The learner was an actor who was not 
actually receiving any shocks.149 
Milgram repeated the same essential scenario with varying 
proximity and levels of contact between subject and learner. 
Throughout the tests, subjects exhibited considerable physical 
signs of stress, at times verbally rejecting the experiment. 
Subjects’ protests, however, often did not affect their compliance 
with the demands of the experimenter.150 Milgram expressed 
surprise at the high level of obedience by subjects in the first 
experiment.151 In 1974, Milgram repeated his experiments with 
female subjects and obtained a rate of obedience nearly identical 
to his first all-male experiments.152 
Milgram noted that obedience to the experimenter’s 
demands was lower when the learner and subject were closer 
together.153 Milgram suggested several possible reasons for this 
result. For example, the subject may feel less shame and guilt 
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about his action when he cannot see the victim.154 Milgram also 
considered the scientific and institutional authority of the 
experimenter to carry significant implications, writing, “if in this 
study an anonymous experimenter could successfully command 
adults to subdue a fifty-year-old man, and force on him painful 
electric shocks against his protests, one can only wonder what 
government, with its vastly greater authority and prestige, can 
command of its subjects.”155 
In 1971, Professor Philip Zimbardo at Stanford University 
established a mock prison in which subjects were to be split into 
guard and prisoner groups for a duration of two weeks.156 The 
goal of the experiment was to explore interpersonal dynamics in 
a context of confinement. After six days, however, the exercise 
was terminated as the guards degraded and brutalized the 
prisoners. None of the participants in the study had shown any 
particular signs of aggression or cruelty in their pre-experiment 
assessments. As in the case of Milgram’s studies, Zimbardo and 
his colleagues had not predicted the level and intensity of 
deteriorating conditions in the mock prison. 
It should be noted that the nature and execution of 
Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments generated some 
controversy among colleagues and observers. For example, in 
her response to one of Milgram’s early studies, Baumrind 
criticized the initial deception of subjects as a fundamental 
violation of trust that could harm them psychologically by 
making them think they had injured someone. Furthermore, she 
argued that the laboratory setting was not an appropriate venue 
to truly test obedience to authority because subjects entered the 
experiment with a pre-existing deference to and dependence on 
the scientific knowledge of the experimenter.157 The Stanford 
Prison Experiment also raised serious ethical questions on the 
treatment of subjects. Professor Zimbardo participated directly 
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in the experiment as Prison Superintendant. In this role, he 
urged the guards to create an environment that stripped 
prisoners of their individuality and made them feel powerless: 
“[T]o the extent that the guards did become brutal, it could be 
argued that this was due more to the intervention of 
Zimbardo . . . than to their inherent psychology.”158 
The central theme emerging from the work of both Milgram 
and Zimbardo is that the role or position of individuals in a 
hierarchical power structure will determine their behavior and 
can lead to brutality in deference to authority. This “group role” 
argument has been challenged as incomplete by proponents of 
social identity theory. Rather than behavior being dictated 
purely by institutional position, Haslam and Reicher argue that 
“people do not take on group roles uncritically but do so only 
after they have internalised them as part of a social identity that 
is shared with other people.”159 In reviewing Zimbardo’s writings 
on the Stanford Prison Experiment, Haslam and Reicher contest 
his account of a situation in which the assigned roles of guard 
and prisoner inevitably led to cruelty. They argue that Zimbardo 
glossed over instances in which the guards resisted 
encouragement to be brutal. Furthermore, as noted supra, 
Zimbardo himself assumed the role of Superintendent of the 
mock prison and issued instructions to the guards, influencing 
significantly the behavior of his own subjects.160 As a result of 
this intervention, Haslam and Reicher argue that the Stanford 
Prison Experiment “provides limited insight into the way in 
which tyranny emerges as part of a social process that develops 
over time.”161 
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In the early 2000s, Haslam and Reicher carried out another 
prison experiment similar to Zimbardo’s, but with some key 
differences.162 First, they took no formal role in the mock prison. 
Another significant difference was the possibility of social 
mobility at the outset—i.e., a prisoner could become a guard. 
Later on, they found that when social mobility was eliminated, 
the prisoners developed a stronger sense of shared social 
identity. When an industrial relations specialist was introduced 
into the prisoner group, the prisoners challenged the existing 
power structure, which eventually led to the negotiated 
establishment of a more equitable commune. Faced with 
difficulties in maintaining order, however, many subjects 
favored reverting to a hierarchical structure toward the end of 
the experiment. This development did not emerge from role-
based behavior, Haslam and Reicher argued, but rather from the 
subversion of roles caused by the emergence of evolving identity-
based group dynamics over the course of the study.163 
2. Group Identity 
People naturally tend to divide the world into groups, based 
on even minimal similarities.164 Staub studied this tendency and 
its effects.165 He refers to the idea of preferring similar people as 
establishing “ingroups.” Staub writes that “People have a need 
to maintain their understanding of the world, or to create new 
understanding . . . .They need to defend their personal and 
societal self-concepts, and under extreme conditions to defend 
their survival. Many of these needs can be satisfied by 
experiencing a sense of identity with a group of people . . . .”166 
People see others as similar and part of their “ingroup” or, 
conversely, as members of an “outgroup.” Socialization 
contributes to the differentiation between groups and to the 
devaluation of individuals belonging to “outgroups.”167 In 
extreme cases, outgroups are characterized as sub-human or 
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even vermin. 
McDoom identifies a key source of prejudicial attitudes as 
fear resulting from a perceived threat.168 Such threats can be 
material (e.g., threats to wealth, power, or security) or symbolic 
(e.g., threats to values, beliefs, or group norms). He identifies 
four key psycho-social aspects of group conflict: (1) “Boundary 
activation”—as the threat grows, ingroup and outgroup 
distinctions increase in importance; (2) “Outgroup negativity”— 
as the threat increases, so does the devaluation of the outgroup; 
(3) “Outgroup homogenization”—members of the outgroup are 
no longer viewed as individuals; and (4) “Ingroup solidarity”— 
the demand for ingroup loyalty increases with the level of 
threat.169 
Although these conditions are necessary for intergroup 
violence, they are not sufficient. Rather, “while group emotions 
lead to polarized attitudes, it is material or structural 
opportunities that mediate whether these emotions are 
expressed as violence.”170 In other words, it is when the 
devaluation of the outgroup is paired with certain structural and 
social conditions—such as economic desperation or concentrated 
authority—that it can lead to mass violence. As Staub argues, 
difficult life conditions get blamed on outgroups, making them 
the embodiment of threat to ingroups.171 Outgroups thus serve 
as convenient scapegoats for the misfortunes of ingroups. 
Outgroups are made to seem dangerous and therefore become 
legitimate targets of violence in the name of defending the 
ingroup. 
The ways in which this dynamic played out in Nazi 
Germany are well-documented.172 The somewhat more-recent 
Rwandan genocide also offers a salient example. In colonial 
Rwanda, the Belgian administration cemented a historical, 
psychological split between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic 
groups. Starting in 1931, for example, Rwandan identity cards 
identified the ethnicity of the bearer, a practice which continued 
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through independence and up until the genocide in 1994. The 
Belgian administration also cultivated the belief that the Tutsi 
were a superior race to the Hutu, descended from an ancient 
conquering tribe. As such, members of the Tutsi minority were 
more often placed in positions of prestige or authority in the 
colonial era. Conversely, Hutus, despite making up the 
overwhelming majority of the population, were largely excluded 
from socio-economic opportunities and authority. 
At the time of independence, however, the Tutsis lost this 
privileged colonial-era status and subsequent Hutu nationalist 
governments stripped them of power. As Hatzfeld wrote, 
“Having conflated the once-privileged Tutsi aristocrat with the 
hardworking Tutsi peasant, the populist Hutu administration 
depicted all Tutsis as scheming, treacherous speculators and 
parasites in an overpopulated country.”173 Throughout the post-
independence period, Tutsis were subject to periodic massacres 
and discriminatory laws.174 In 1990, the outbreak of civil war 
intensified anti-Tutsi sentiment: “[W]hile the attacking Tutsi 
rebels were gaining ground, speeches at Rwandan political 
meetings, notably at rallies held by the party of President 
Habyarimana and his ministers, consisted almost entirely of 
threats made against Tutsis.”175 After Habyarimana’s 
assassination in April 1994, Hutu extremists executed a plan to 
eliminate the Tutsi population altogether, deploying security 
forces to coordinate mass murder among the populace. 
Estimates vary, but 800,000 killed is an oft-quoted number.176 
Hutu extremists also hunted down and killed many Hutus who 
sheltered or otherwise aided Tutsis during the civil war. 
McDoom identifies critical aspects of ethnic identity in 
Rwanda leading up to the genocide, namely: (1) The social 
construction of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” identity over time; and (2) 
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The use of ethnicity by political elites as a political and social 
device. It was not until the civil war and the assassination of the 
president—i.e., an elevated situation of threat—that group 
division in Rwanda led to extermination-level violence.177 
Propaganda played a crucial role in solidifying ingroup and 
outgroup identity before and during the genocide. Radio 
broadcasts labeled Tutsis as “cockroaches,” characterizing them 
as an inhuman infestation. 
The concept of purity is an important element of the twisted 
logic of genocidal violence. By ridding society of the outgroup, 
the ingroup eliminates a key source of its misfortune and thus 
“purifies” itself. Dawes explains this mentality: “If a culture can 
successfully cultivate all-or-nothing, polar thinking, it can divide 
the world into the pure and impure. The impure deserve injury 
not only because their impurity is inherently disgusting, but also 
because it threatens to contaminate the community of the 
pure.”178 In this sense, the outgroup is dehumanized to brutal 
effect; eradicating it becomes a medical act—like disinfecting a 
wound or administering an antidote—to promote the health of 
the ingroup. As Lifton observed in regard to the Holocaust, “Nazi 
perpetrators had to see their victims as posing absolute danger, 
as ‘infecting’ the ‘German national body,’ and as (in the last three 
words of Hitler’s testament) ‘deadly Jewish poison’ . . . .[T]he 
general danger of ‘inner Judaization’ and ‘racial pollution’ was 
perceived as a fundamental threat to German biological and 
biosocial continuity and immortality.”179 Similarly, Hatzfeld 
remarked on how purity during the Rwandan genocide was 
construed in agricultural terms: “In the rural land of Rwanda, 
genocide was meant to purify the earth, to cleanse it of its 
cockroach farmers.”180 
3.  Socialization 
Ingrouping and outgrouping are essential components in the 
production of perpetrators of mass atrocity. In many cases, 
scholars have noted that perpetrators are not only socialized to 
accept extreme violence, but also to view themselves as 
defenders of the ingroup. In his book on Japanese war criminals 
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convicted following World War II, Dawes sums up how scholars 
understand the use of group identity to methodically construct 
the roles, institutions, and conceptions of the other that drive 
mass violence: 
Today, most scholars trace genocidal behavior to 
organizational identity, social context, and national 
ideologies, rather than individual personalities . . . . 
So what do political movements need to make the 
monsters they need? 
First, everybody agrees, you must put them in a 
group . . . . 
Group membership can promote not only 
deindividuation, in which the moral self is 
psychologically submerged [in a collective], but also what 
might be called intra-individuation, in which the moral 
self is psychically subdivided . . . In other words, with 
deindividuation your relationship to yourself is mediated 
through your collectivized identity; with intra-
individuation your relationship to others is mediated 
through your specialized social role. The other becomes 
an abstraction . . . . 
The existence of roles demanding antisocial behavior, of 
course, is not enough. Such roles are usually self-
limiting. Law provides minimal authorization, and 
personality provides maximal resistance. Both say: Go 
only this far. To make war criminals . . . you need the 
opposite combination: maximal authorization and 
minimal personality. 
But making monsters isn’t only a matter of conditioning; 
it’s also a matter of narrative. Commonly among 
unrepentant war criminals, you will see a grandiose self-
pity that helps them to preserve a sense of self: I bore the 
burden of having to do these things. [Psychiatrist] Robert 
Jay Lifton saw this narrative template in the Nazi 
doctors at Auschwitz . . . Such self-absolution, in 
Germany and elsewhere, is made possible by the stories 
of historical mission and utopian possibility provided by 
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charismatic leaders.181 
Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros’ landmark study of torturers 
in the Greek Army (1967-74) paints a telling picture of the 
complex interplay of obedience to authority and group 
identity.182 Torture did not come naturally to Greek military 
recruits, but was a product of forced obedience to authority and 
desensitization to violence. Before being drafted into the 
military, the men that Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros studied had 
no record of violence. Trainers used brutality toward the recruits 
themselves to accustom them gradually to casual violence.183 To 
encourage obedience, the men were physically beaten, verbally 
abused, and forced to swear loyalty to the military 
government.184 Next, trainers forced the men to watch while 
prisoners were tortured.185 Finally, the recruits participated in 
and administered beatings and other methods of torture to 
prisoners.186 
When soldiers followed orders, including carrying out 
torture, their commanders would relax the rules of conduct to 
positively reinforce soldiers’ behavior.187 Disobedience, however, 
brought harassment, punishment, and intimidation.188 Strict 
obedience and desensitization were closely tied to the production 
of group identity among soldiers in the Greek Army Police Corps 
(ESA), the elite military unit on which the study focused. “While 
being harassed and beaten by their officers,” Gibson and 
Haritous-Fatouros wrote, “servicemen were repeatedly told how 
fortunate they were to have joined the ESA, the . . . most 
important support of the regime . . . .In-group language helped 
the men to develop elitist attitudes . . . .Gradually, the recruits 
came to speak of all people who were not in their group, parents 
and families included, as belonging to the ‘outside world.’”189 
In her study of wartime sexual violence, mentioned supra on 
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pages 19–20, Cohen uncovered a similar dynamic. She explored 
why some militaries and insurgent groups chronically rape but 
others do not. While identifying state weakness and “lootable 
resources” as significant contributing factors, Cohen found 
strong evidence suggesting that the recruiting mechanism used 
by armed groups is a decisive factor in whether their agents will 
commit rape.190 Specifically, her study found that members of 
groups that used extreme forms of forcible recruitment tended 
to rape far more often than groups using less coercive 
methods.191 In these situations, rape becomes a way to promote 
social cohesion among abducted recruits with no preexisting 
social ties to each other. Participation in violent and public acts 
together, such as gang rape, is used to form such ties.192 Cohen 
concludes, “Reports of abduction by armed groups may serve as 
an early warning sign of an escalating threat of wartime rape. 
Such a threat may be especially acute under conditions of state 
collapse and the presence of lootable resources.”193 
While exclusionary ideologies provide the foundation for 
atrocities, their mass perpetration involves their conversion into 
routine. Hannah Arendt’s famous coverage of the 1961 trial of 
Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann explores this issue. Eichmann 
coordinated logistics for mass deportations of Jews and others to 
Nazi death camps during the Second World War. Despite his 
participation in the Holocaust, Eichmann did not strike Arendt 
as particularly cruel or remarkable in any other way. In his 
bureaucratic role, he represented what Arendt referred to as 
“the banality of evil,” meaning that the commission of mass 
atrocities (and Eichmann’s role therein) became a routinized 
daily affair, accompanied by its own euphemistic language: “This 
‘objective’ attitude—talking about concentration camps in terms 
of ‘administration’ and about extermination camps in terms of 
‘economy’—was typical of the S.S. mentality and something that 
Eichmann, at the trial, was still very proud of.”194 
Although some later scholarship calls into question 
Eichmann’s “ordinariness,”195 Arendt’s discussion of the 
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routinization of atrocity still carries validity. In Hatzfeld’s 
interviews with perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, for 
example, one man, Ignace, described how his gang became numb 
to the horrors they inflicted: “At the beginning we were too fired 
up to think. Later on we were too used to it. In our condition, it 
meant nothing to us to think we were busy cutting our neighbors 
down to the last one. It became a goes-without-saying.”196 The 
use of institutions to normalize this violence is a key factor as 
well. As Dawes observes, “[F]or violence to be extensive over 
space and durable over time, it needs many concentric rings of 
support . . . .You need the workers and bureaucrats who 
maintain the institutions that produce the violence.”197 Many of 
Hatzfeld’s interviewees explained how low-level officials 
organized locals into gangs and set the routine for killing.198 One 
perpetrator, Pancrace, described it as follows: “[W]e went up to 
the soccer field around nine or ten o’clock. The leaders would 
grumble about latecomers, and we would go off on the attack. 
Rule number one was to kill. There was no rule number two. It 
was an organization without complications.”199 
III. CHALLENGES IN HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH 
Studies of human rights have been generally one of two 
types: qualitative or quantitative. Although there are studies 
that combine the two types, real differences often exist between 
scholars who focus more on one set of methods or another.200 
Qualitative research tends to focus on either case studies of 
particular countries or human rights situations (and in some 
cases both). Quantitative studies use statistical methods to 
study trends in human rights violations over time and to 
calculate probabilities. Hafner-Burton and Ron have noted that, 
in general, qualitative case studies tend toward more positive 
assessments of the effectiveness of international human rights 
instruments, while statistical studies are less optimistic. They 
suggest that these distinctions are attributable not only to 
methodological differences, but also to disparate core 
assumptions, noting that “the gap between qualitative and 
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quantitative researchers is so wide that many liken it to a 
religious or cultural divide.”201 
Quantitative analysis is viewed by some scholars and 
practitioners as a way to develop standardized measures of 
human rights.202 Public audiences often view numbers as 
objectively truthful and endow statistics with greater authority 
than more subjective statements. Statistical measurements, 
however, usually come with qualifications. As Human Rights 
Watch analyst Brian Root explains, “When human rights 
organizations publish figures, even with caveats on limitations, 
the public will often interpret these figures as facts.”203 Root 
cautions that “What must be asked of any dataset is, ‘Why were 
data recorded, and why would other data have been missed?’”204 
In the human rights context, then, quantitative indicators may 
offer a less complete picture than might generally be assumed. 
Sikkink discusses how one key function of human rights work is 
to render “invisible harms” (such as torture or domestic violence) 
visible, which poses a key challenge: “Most invisible harms are 
‘invisible by design’—that is, the perpetrators take steps to avoid 
detection. Because of that [issue], we can’t measure these human 
rights violations, only reports of them. For example, when 
academics are coding Amnesty International reports, they 
produce a data set of Amnesty International alleged violations, 
‘not a census of actual violations.’”205 
When drawing causal conclusions about human rights, 
scholars and practitioners should beware of information effects, 
defined as “patterns in the data stemming from the process of 
information collection and interpretation, rather than the 
process that actually gives rise to human rights violations or 
their mitigation.”206 In regard to quantitative indices, these 
information effects can bias the results of statistical analysis. 
For example, the U.S. State Department and Amnesty 
International may have difficulty obtaining verifiable 
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information from a country where major human rights abuses 
are occurring. This lack of information will affect the resulting 
reports, which will, in turn, affect how researchers code human 
rights conditions for a particular country into the PTS or CIRI 
scales. 
When the tools and methods for gathering information 
improve over time, this change can produce inconsistencies in 
the source material for statistical studies. Better reporting 
capacity can result in an “information paradox”—that is, 
something can appear to occur more often or with more intensity 
over time if it is monitored more effectively than before.207 In an 
epidemiological context, for example, the introduction of a more 
accurate method for diagnosing a given disease may result in 
more documented cases and, accordingly, an increase in the 
reported infection rate. At face value, the data would give the 
impression of a worsening health situation. It may simply be, 
however, that current conditions are no different than previous 
conditions, or perhaps have even improved. If this scenario is 
true, then all that has really changed is the enhanced capability 
to diagnose cases of the disease. Similarly, if local NGOs in a 
given country augment their capacity to collect information on 
human rights abuses by, for instance, hiring more staff to 
conduct more frequent fact-finding interviews, the NGOs may 
uncover more violations than previously known. This 
observation may be due to better reporting by the NGOs and 
may not necessarily be indicative of a deteriorating situation. 
NGOs may then unintentionally depict a worsening human 
rights situation in their publicity and outreach. 
“Attention bias” can have a similar effect: if the human 
rights situation in a given country becomes grave, it may attract 
more focus from human rights advocates and journalists than 
before the crisis. Even after the crisis abates, the subsequent 
elevated scrutiny may uncover more human rights violations 
than were observed—or observable—before.208 Clark and 
Sikkink noted that even when real improvements occur, 
countries rated at high levels of repression in PTS and CIRI tend 
to keep those ratings over time.209 
Changes in the nature of the source material itself may also 
affect the reliability of statistical analysis. For example, a 
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congressional audit of U.S. State Department reports from the 
early 1980s found that the reports were more lenient toward 
U.S.-allied violators in several countries as a result of pressure 
from the Reagan administration. The reports became less biased 
as time passed, however, which also affected PTS and CIRI 
coding.210 Standards of what constitute “severe violations” have 
also changed; what may have counted as a moderate human 
rights violation in the 1970s may be viewed as severe by current 
standards. These and other information effects may lead 
quantitative indices like PTS and CIRI to reflect a more 
pessimistic view of human rights conditions than may be 
warranted.211 
This latter factor may be at work in studies of repression 
associated with the democratization process, as discussed supra 
on pages 11–14. In some notable cases, there is an apparent 
disjuncture in the data between state behavior and state 
structure. Ron and Hafner-Burton observe that “political 
democracy and the human rights behavior of individual states 
are not identical, and the quantitative measures of each are not 
highly correlated.”212 They note that this phenomenon may be 
partially explained by information effects: “There may . . . be 
more reports of abuse from countries that are in fact less abusive, 
since the less repressive countries often have a freer press.”213 
As Sikkink writes, “Increased information and higher standards 
are both good news for human rights victims, but they can be 
bad news for data sets and measurement, which try to compare 
numbers about human rights over time.”214 
It should also be remembered that the conclusions of 
quantitative studies are general and probabilistic in nature, 
rather than true in every instance. Quantitative studies may 
identify the degree to which social or political factor A influences 
the likelihood of human rights violation B, but it does not follow 
that violation B will always occur when factor A is present. 
Qualitative evidence and analysis can often detect contextual 
improvements in human rights conditions in ways that 
statistical methods may miss. For example, Clark and Sikkink 
found that the CIRI ratings for Guatemala were the same in 
1982-83 as in 1990. Other evidence, however, including the 
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Guatemalan Truth Commission (1997-99) report, indicates that 
lethal government repression peaked in 1982-83. In 1982, there 
were well over 17,000 deaths and disappearances, compared to 
598 in 1990. So while personal integrity violations still occurred 
in Guatemala in 1990, they were less severe and widespread 
than in the early 1980s.215 
Even taking these information effects into account, 
however, quantitative studies can still yield instructive and 
useful results that enhance understanding of human rights 
conditions. Qualitative studies can provide crucial context, 
nuance, understanding, and additional evidence that may not be 
adequately captured by statistics. Qualitative studies vary 
greatly in scope and focus, however. They often lack 
standardized methods of observation and analysis, making 
comparative work more difficult.216 Comparative work can be 
difficult between statistical studies also, depending on what 
information gaps exist in the data sets in question. For example, 
some governments may be able and willing to collect better data 
than others. This more complete information may make it 
appear that human rights violations are more prevalent in those 
countries. The problem may be worse in other countries that do 
not collect relevant figures—or at least not as thoroughly—but 
the lack of data makes it difficult to demonstrate by statistical 
means.217 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods of study have 
advantages and limitations. As Sikkink observes, “Some data is 
better than no data, but not all sources of data are equal.”218 An 
accurate view of a given human rights situation is more likely to 
emerge from using a variety of information sources and analysis 
tools. While recent developments in causal research on human 
rights are positive and illuminating, there are still gaps to fill. 
As discussed supra on pages 22–25, research on violations of 
economic and social rights lags significantly behind studies on 
civil and political rights. Economic and social rights cover some 
of the most basic human needs and require further serious study 
and analysis. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL NORM DYNAMICS 
After examining principal causes of human rights violations 
and compliance, it is useful to examine how governments 
internalize international human rights norms. This issue is a 
political one as much as it is a legal one. It is one thing for a 
government to sign and ratify a treaty and quite another to make 
a sincere effort to uphold treaty obligations. Indeed, the 
traditional “international relations” model posits one 
government of a sovereign nation-state negotiating in some way 
with one or more other governments. These governments 
interact mainly on security or trade issues between them. 
Concern over the internal affairs of another country is not a 
significant factor in this traditional model. Yet the modern 
backdrop is more complicated. In the decades following World 
War II, international leaders increasingly challenged the notion 
that governments have exclusive sovereignty over what happens 
within their borders. Since then, most countries in the world 
have signed on to at least one human rights treaty, signaling a 
public agreement to have their internal conduct scrutinized by 
external actors. The relatively recent proliferation of human 
rights NGOs and other non-state actors has prompted a body of 
scholarship which attempts to discern how these international 
norms influence state behavior. 
In their seminal work, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998), 
Margaret Keck and Kathyrn Sikkink described the growth and 
impact of transnational NGO coalitions on state and 
intergovernmental decision-making.219 Using the examples of 
human rights in Latin America, environmental policy, and 
violence against women, the authors describe how advocacy 
networks define new global issues and effect change. Human 
rights advocates do so by winning commitments from key 
individuals in governments and monitoring the implementation 
of those commitments. Keck and Sikkink’s “Boomerang Pattern” 
theory showed how such changes may occur: an NGO in state A 
will work with an NGO in state B (or an international NGO) to 
change state B’s foreign policy with the objective of pressuring 
state A to change its domestic practices. Subsequent research 
has delved further into the nuances of how states internalize 
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international norms. 
A. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 
In her pioneering study, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009), Beth 
Simmons explored the answer to the question: “Why would a 
government decide to make a commitment to its peers 
internationally to behave in certain ways toward its own 
citizens?”220 Different states may join human rights treaties for 
different reasons. Often, a state’s decision to ratify (or not) is the 
product of its political preferences—that is, the ratifying state 
genuinely supports the content of the treaty and can bind itself 
with relatively low costs for compliance. For example, “States 
with strong democratic participation and civil liberties tend to 
support treaties that reflect those . . . ideals . . . . Autocratic 
regimes have little natural preference for committing 
themselves to provide expanded rights to their people.”221 
For many states, this conclusion is intuitive enough, but the 
picture becomes more complex when governments with 
seemingly no predilection for a given treaty’s content ratify it 
anyway. Simmons labels such governments as “false positives,” 
which she defines as “states that ratify international human 
rights agreements but apparently without any intention of 
trying to come into compliance with their obligations.”222 False 
positives appear to be making short-term calculations to deflect 
international criticism by signing a treaty, but ratification often 
has unanticipated—and unintended—domestic consequences.223 
These domestic effects are particularly strong in countries 
where the political system is in a state of flux—that is, neither a 
strong democracy nor a stable authoritarian government.224 
Treaties offer domestic advocates an additional legal and 
political basis on which to make demands on their 
government.225 Discussing her findings on ratification of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
Simmons observed that “[G]overnments’ willingness to reduce 
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interference in the free practice of religion was associated with 
ratification of the ICCPR, but this effect was especially strong in 
this large, heterogeneous set of [transitional] countries. Even 
more striking, only in these partially democratic or transitioning 
countries did the ICCPR have any effect on provisions for a civil 
liberty as important as fair trials. Similarly, the [Convention 
Against Torture] has had a significantly bigger positive impact 
in countries in which democracy has had a tenuous foothold.”226 
Simmons notes that ratification also requires states to report to 
treating monitoring bodies, to which domestic rights advocates 
can submit shadow reports challenging their government’s 
version of events.227 
International human rights norms influence states in 
deeper and subtler ways beyond decisions on treaty ratification. 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons found that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent treaties informed 
many of the substantive rights obligations contained in national 
constitutions around the world.228 They observed that certain 
core human rights provisions are the most ubiquitous, including 
freedoms of expression, religion, and association.229 Privacy 
rights and prohibitions on slavery are also widespread.230 Not all 
constitutions reflect international norms comprehensively, 
although the average number of rights contained in 
constitutions has increased over time along with the 
development of international human rights treaties.231 
A large number of constitutions crafted in the years 
immediately following 1948 incorporate many provisions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture 
exhibited similar influence in the time periods surrounding their 
drafting or, and sometimes including, entry into force. 
“Constitution writers working under the umbrella of 
international rights treaties are more likely to pattern their 
documents after the international instruments,” write Elkins et 
al., “but they are even more likely to do so if their country has 
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ratified the instrument. These findings are consistent with a 
view in which international instruments provide a focal set of 
norms for constitution makers.”232 The authors argue that 
ratification and constitutionalization of rights provisions 
improve domestic human rights practices by increasing the 
likelihood of enforcement.233 They found this observation 
especially applies where there is greater opportunity for 
domestic political action.234 
B. “ACCULTURATION” AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Evidence also suggests that states are motivated to adopt 
human rights norms in part because other countries do so, which 
Goodman and Jinks call “acculturation.”235 They define 
acculturation as “the general process by which actors adopt the 
beliefs and behavior patterns of the surrounding culture. More 
specifically, this mechanism induces behavioral changes by 
pressures to assimilate—some imposed by other actors and some 
imposed by the self.”236 This process is distinct from persuasion 
in that it operates less explicitly and focuses on the relationship 
between norm adopters and other actors, not the content of the 
norm itself.237 On a global level, states adopt international 
norms, including human rights, partly in response to a sort of 
macro-level peer pressure—e.g., a state endorses a human rights 
norm adopted by other countries with which the state shares 
intergovernmental organization membership. Conversely, states 
that are more isolated are more likely to eschew global norms.238 
One example of acculturation arises when a country adopts 
a norm for which it does not necessarily have a functional 
need.239 An example of this phenomenon is the global norm of 
constitutional governance structure. As Goodman and Jinks 
write,  
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A quick survey of the globe shows that national 
constitutions exhibit remarkable isomorphism across a 
range of rights-related dimensions . . . . Some current 
states . . . resemble early Westphalian states more than 
they resemble their twenty-first-century counterparts. 
Yet almost all current states still elect to have a written 
constitution . . . . Nearly every constitution adopted since 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . has 
contained some set of rights provisions.240 
Kathryn Sikkink’s groundbreaking study of transitional 
justice norms provides a compelling example of regional 
acculturation and the interaction between international norms 
and domestic politics.241 Sikkink charts the spread of the 
increasingly prevalent norm that government leaders 
responsible for grave human rights violations should be held 
criminally accountable for their actions. She observes that Latin 
American countries have conducted the bulk of domestic human 
rights trials, carrying out 55% of such trials between 1979 and 
2009.242 It was Argentina’s prosecution of ex-junta leaders in the 
1980s that inspired numerous other domestic prosecutions. 
Sikkink writes,  
[W]hy were the Argentines more successful in diffusing 
their model [of transitional justice] than the Greeks or 
the Portuguese had been? First, Argentina was operating 
in a region where dozens of other countries were 
undergoing transition at the same time . . . . Second, the 
Argentine human rights movement had inserted itself 
more firmly within the consolidating international 
movement.243 
V. CONCLUSION 
Valuable perspectives on human rights causality come from 
a variety of academic disciplines and practical expertise. The 
present article has covered many studies, methodological tools, 
and sources of data by which to measure and evaluate human 
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rights conditions. No one study, tool, or dataset is a panacea. 
Practitioners and scholars should avail themselves of a large 
analytical “toolbox.” They should also be discerning, considering 
which methods and sources of evidence are most appropriate to 
help answer their research questions. Uncritically accepting the 
findings of one type of study over others risks blinding scholars 
and practitioners to other valuable knowledge. When one only 
has a hammer, everything looks like a nail.244 
It is worth now revisiting one of this article’s introductory 
questions: why should scholars and practitioners study the 
causes of human rights violations? What is the use in doing so? 
To address a complex problem with any success, one must first 
understand it. As the introduction argues, knowing the causes 
of rights violations can improve responses to and help prevent 
such abuses, as well as improve the effectiveness of existing 
mechanisms and efforts. Understanding causation shines light 
on the conditions in which human rights compliance can thrive. 
For example, countries with independent judiciaries tend to 
experience less repression, especially when combined with 
multiparty elections and limitations on executive power. In this 
context, courts can serve as a bulwark against repression by 
imposing legal and reputational costs on political authorities 
who use excessive force. With this understanding in mind, 
human rights leaders can support efforts to strengthen a 
country’s judicial institutions. Possible actions and policies to 
achieve this end include: enacting constitutional protections for 
judicial independence and authority; training judges in human 
rights norms; mobilizing public pressure on political leaders to 
respect court decisions; ensuring all parties to a case have 
adequate legal representation; and investing in sufficient 
courtroom facilities. 
Causal research can inform future investigations and 
enhance predictive capabilities, such as the detection of warning 
signs of a potential human rights crisis. For example, if a 
national leader compares a certain ethnic group within his or 
her country to vermin, human rights advocates can identify this 
dehumanizing language as a warning sign of a potential violence 
toward members of that group. With this understanding, 
advocates can examine what additional structural factors—such 
as competition for scarce resources—may lead to an outbreak of 
mass violence. Human rights leaders can mobilize international 
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pressure to push the government to stop using dehumanizing 
language and rescind discriminatory policies. In the long-term, 
advocates can encourage governments to address larger 
structural factors through equitable socio-economic policies. 
While understanding causation is an integral part of 
successful human rights advocacy, causal research can also 
serve a persuasive function. In the past few years, populist, 
nationalist, and authoritarian political forces in the United 
States, Europe, the Philippines, and elsewhere, pose a renewed 
direct challenge human rights. In the U.S., for example, 
President Donald Trump was elected on a nationalist, anti-
immigrant platform, receiving public support from white 
supremacist leaders. As a result of such developments, the 
human rights movement is put in the position of having to 
defend its basic principles in a credible way. As Philip Alston 
observed in his recent article on human rights and populism, 
“[W]e need to acknowledge the need to devote more time and 
effort to being persuasive and convincing, rather than simply 
annunciating our principles as though they were self-evidently 
correct and applicable.”245 
Causal research can help human rights advocates make the 
case for policies that contribute to the promotion and protection 
of human rights. The ability to explain the conditions in which 
abuses thrive can also aid in persuading stakeholders that 
human rights advocates’ policy proposals are credible. These 
explanations may also convey a sense that human rights 
violations are solvable or at least manageable problems. This 
essential message, that human rights conditions can and should 
improve, may sustain the human rights movement in the face of 
formidable challenges. 
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